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263 Avenue Général Leclerc, 35042 Rennes,
jean-louis.lanet@inria.fr
http://secinfo.msi.unilim.fr/lanet/
Abstract. Smart cards have been considered for a long time as a secure
container for storing secret data and executing programs that manipulate
them without leaking any information. In the last decade, a new form
of attack that uses the hardware has been intensively studied. We have
proposed in the past to pay attention also to easier attacks that use only
software. We demonstrated through several proof of concepts that such
an approach should be a threat under some hypotheses. We have been
able to execute self-modifying code, return address programming and so
on. More recently we have been able to retrieve secret keys belonging
to another application. Then all the already published attacks should
have been a threat but the industry increased the counter measures to
mitigate for each of the published attack. In such a sensitive domain, we
always submit the attacks to the industrial partners but also national
agencies before publishing any attack. Within such an approach, they
have been able to patch their system before any vulnerabilities should
be exploited.
Keywords: Smart Card, Attacks, Ethical Process
1 Introduction
Java Card is a kind of smart card that implements one of the two editions, “Clas-
sic Edition” or “Connected Edition”, of the standard Java Card 3.0 [12]. Such
a smart card embeds a virtual machine which interprets codes already romized
with the operating system or downloaded after issuance. Due to security reasons,
the ability to download code into the card is controlled by a protocol defined by
Global Platform [7]. This protocol ensures that the owner of the code has the
necessary authorization to perform the action. Java Card is an open platform for
smart cards, i.e. able of loading and executing new applications after issuance.
Thus, different applications from different providers run in the same smart card.
Thanks to type verification, byte codes delivered by the Java compiler and the
converter (in charge of giving a compact representation of class files) are safe,
i.e. the loaded application is not hostile to other applications in the Java Card.





the card, enforcing isolation between them.
Java Cards have shown an improved robustness compared to native applica-
tions regarding many attacks. They are designed to resist to numerous attacks
using both physical and logical techniques. Currently, the most powerful attacks
are hardware based attacks and particularly fault attacks. A fault attack modifies
parts of memory content or signal on internal bus and lead to deviant behavior
exploitable by an attacker. A comprehensive consequence of such attacks can
be found in [11]. Although fault attacks have been mainly used in the literature
from a cryptanalytic point of view (see [1, 9, 13]), they can be applied to every
code layers embedded in a device. For instance, while choosing the exact byte of
a program the attacker can bypass counter-measures or logical tests.
The design of a Java Card virtual machine cannot rely on the environmental
hypotheses of Java. In fact, physical attacks have never been taken into account
during the design of the Java platform. To fill this gap, card designers developed
an interpreter which relies on the principle that once the application has been
linked to the card, it will not be modifiable again. The trade-off is between a
highly defensive virtual machine which will be too slow to operate and an of-
fensive interpreter that will expose too much vulnerabilities. The know-how of
a smart card design is in the choice of a set of minimal counter-measures with
high fault coverage.
Nevertheless some attacks have been successful in retrieving secret data from
the card. Thus we will present here a survey of different approaches to get ac-
cess to data, which should bypass Java security components. The aim of an
attacker is to generate malicious applications which can bypass firewall restric-
tions and modify other applications, even if they do not belong to the same
security package. Several papers were published and they differ essentially on
the hypotheses of the platform vulnerabilities. After a brief presentation of the
Java Card platform and its security functions, we will present attacks based on a
faulty implementation of the transaction, due to ambiguities in the specification.
Then we will describe the flaws that can be exploited with an ill-typed applet
and we will finish with hostile applet that gain privilege to access the physical
processor leading to the dump of the operating system and the crypto API.
2 Smart Card Security
Smart cards security depends on the underlying hardware and the embedded
software. Embedded sensors (light sensors, heat sensors, voltage sensors, etc.)
protect the card from physical attacks. While the card detects such an attack, it
has the possibility to erase quickly the content of the EEPROM preserving the
confidentiality of secret data or blocking definitely the card (Card is mute). In
addition to the hardware protection, softwares are designed to securely ensure
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and also sometimes during execution. They also manage sensitive information
and ensure that the current operation is authorized before executing it. The
Byte Code Verifier guarantees type correctness of code, which in turn guaran-
tees the Java properties regarding memory access. For example, it is impossible
in Java to perform arithmetic on reference. Thus, it must be proved that the
two elements on top of the stack are of primitive types before performing any
arithmetic operation. On the Java platform, byte code verification is invoked
at load time by the loader. Due to the fact that Java Card does not support
dynamic class loading, byte code verification is performed at installation time
i.e. before loading the Card APplet (CAP) onto the card. However, most of the
Java Card smart cards do not have an on-card BCV as it is quite expensive in
terms of memory consumption. Thus, a trusted third party performs an off-card
byte code verification and sign it, and on card its digital signature is checked.
Moreover, the Firewall performs checks at runtime to prevent applets from
accessing (reading or writing) data of other applets. When an applet is created,
the system uses a unique applet identifier (AID) from which it is possible to
retrieve the name of the package in which it is defined. If two applets are in-
stances of classes coming from the same Java Card package, they are considered
belonging to the same context. The firewall isolates the contexts in such a way
that a method executing in one context cannot access any attribute or method
of objects belonging to another context unless it explicitly exposes functionality
via a Shareable Interface Object.
Smart card security is a complex problem with different points of view but
products based on Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM) have passed success-
fully real-world security evaluations for major industries around the world. It
is also the platform that has passed high level security evaluations for issuance
by banking associations and by leading government authorities, they have also
achieved compliance with FIPS 140-1 certification scheme. Nevertheless imple-
mentations have suffered severals attacks either hardware or software based.
Some of them succeeded into getting access to the EEPROM (code of the down-
loaded applets) but as far as we know nobody succeeded into reversing the code
i.e. having access to the code of the virtual machine, the operating system and
the cryptographic algorithm implementations. These latter are protected by the
interpretation layer which denies access to other memories than the EEPROM.
3 Some Software Attacks again Java Card
3.1 Ambiguity in the specification: the type confusion
Erik Poll made a presentation at CARDIS’08 about attacks on smart cards. In
his paper [10], he did a quick overview of the classical attacks available on smart
cards and gave some counter-measures. He explained the different kinds of at-
tacks and the associated counter-measures. He described four methods (1) CAP





and (4) Transaction Mechanisms abuse.
He proposed a new way to abuse the Transaction mechanism (4). The pur-
pose of transaction is to make a group of operations becomes atomic. Of course,
it is a widely used concept, like in databases, but still hard to implement. By
definition, the rollback mechanism should also deallocate any objects allocated
during an aborted transaction, and reset references to such objects to null. How-
ever, Erik Poll find some strange cases where the card keep the references of
objects allocated during transaction even after a roll back.
If he can get the same behavior, it should be easy to get and exploit type
confusion. A first example is to get two arrays of different types, for example a
byte and a short array. One of them is a field (permanent storage) the second is a
local variable. While aborting the transaction, the permanent reference must be
nullified. But the specification do not explain what to do with local variables if
they reference also a permanent object. Poll discovered that some cards cleared
all the references while other let dangling pointers. In such a case reallocating the
memory will let the dangling pointer referencing another object of potentially
another type. If he declares a byte array of 10 bytes, and he has another reference
as a short array, he will be able to read 10 shorts, so 20 bytes. With this method
he can read the 10 bytes saved after the array. If he increases the size of the
array, he can read as much memory as he wants. The main problem is more how
to read memory before the array. The other confusion he used is an array of
bytes and an object. If he puts a byte as first object attribute, it is bound to the
array length. It is then really easy to change the length of the array using the
reference to the object.
3.2 Weakness in the linker process
The Java Card Specification defines the linking step done during the loading of
CAP file. When the software is downloading in the card, the Java Card Virtual
Machine provides a way to link, the CAP file to install, with the installed Java
Card API. This step is done thanks to a tokens link resolution references in
the Constant Pool component. To friendly find where each token is used, the
Reference Location component keeps a list of offsets, in the Method Compo-
nent. So, in this loading step, the JCVM translates, with the help of the Constant
Pool component and the Reference Location component, each reference to
methods or fields use in the CAP file. To abuse the linking mechanism [14], [8]
we modify the token following any natural instructions, as invokestatic, which
are following by a token. If the card have not any BCV component, a modifica-
tion may push the linked reference on the stack and returned at the end of the
current function.
Using this approach we are able to use the on board linker to generate the
correct information, to store it on top of the stack and to send it back to the
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address of the Java Card API for a given card. For retrieving one address we
need to build one CAP file. Retrieving the complete API, need to generate 98
test cases for the methods of the classes and 60 test cases for the interfaces. All
the test cases are valid whatever the card is tested. It means that the effort to
design the test cases for retrieving the addresses will be reusable on all the cards.
This attack is completely generic and independent of the platform.
3.3 Dumping the EEPROM
As said previously, the verifier must check several points. In particular: there are
no violations of memory management and any stack underflow or overflow. This
means that these checks are potentially not verified during run time and then
can lead to vulnerabilities. The Java frame is a non persistent data structure but
can be implemented in different manners and the specification gives no design
direction for it. Getting access to the RAM provides information of other objects
like the APDU buffer, return address of a method and so on. So, changing the
return of a local address modifies the control flow of the call graph and returns
it to a specific address.
The EMAN2 attack [3] allows to modify the value of the return address of
a method by storing a short into a local. By choosing the right value for the
local number we overwrite the return address. In a given card the return address
register is stored at MAX LOCAL + 2. The value stored in this register will
be the address where Java PC will be updated while returning from the current
method. We just need to define a static array which is stored close to the method
area. Then after returning from the method, the JCVM will execute the content
of the array. Due to the fact that getstatic and putstatic are not checked by
the firewall, we can read the content of the memory. The shell code is presented
in Listing 1.1.
Listing 1.1. Executing the basic shell code
7C 01 00 g e t S t a t i c 0x0100
78 s r e tu rn
This code puts on top of the stack, the content of the memory at the address
0x0100 and returns this value. The caller has just to store it into the APDU
buffer and the value is send to the terminal. Then, the third byte of the static
array must be incremented and the next call will return the value of the address
0x0101. We just need to manage the carry from the low byte to the high byte
representing the address. Another way to update the return address is the sinc
instruction. The sinc instruction aims to increase a local short variable by a
constant value given in its parameter.
Recently, Faugeron [6] presented a way to fool the Java Card runtime based





words and inserts them below. This instruction takes two parameters encoded
on 1-byte where the high nibble describes the number of words to duplicate and
the low nibble defines where the duplicated words are placed. Since the Java
Card operands stack does not contain enough elements, the runtime uses the
system data as words for the dup x instruction. Thus, an attacker can shift the
value of the frame header by a custom words pushed on the stack.
3.4 Dumping the ROM
In [4] we demonstrated the ability to dump the content of the ROM and thus to
get access to the implementation of the cryptographic functions. We used several
weaknesses. During the analysis of EEPROM dump corresponding to a linked
applets into the smart card memory, a method with an abnormal call has been
noticed at the address 0xDBE6. This address corresponds to another EEPROM
address and not a ROM address. At that address we found a table which corre-
sponded to non standard method headers. The JCVM Specification [5] defines a
method as a method header info, described in the listing 1.2, and its associated
byte code.
Listing 1.2. Java Card Method Header Info
method header in fo {
u1 b i t f i e l d {
b i t [ 4 ] f l a g s // a mask o f m o d i f i e r s de f i ned f o r the method
b i t [ 4 ] max stack // max c e l l s r equ i r ed during execut ion o f
// the method
}
u1 b i t f i e l d {
b i t [ 4 ] nargs // number o f parameters passed to the method
b i t [ 4 ] max loca l s // number o f l o c a l v a r i a b l e s dec l a r ed
// by the method
}
}
For the flag value, three defined possibilities are expected:
– 0x0: it is a normal method;
– 0x8 (ACC EXTENDED): the method represents an extended method;
– 0x4 (ACC ABSTRACT): the method represents an abstract method;
– All other flag values are reserved.
Each methods of the table contains a non standardized flag value (i.e. : 2).
Moreover, the associated byte code (1-byte) cannot be an instruction. On the
other side, we also also have a set of interesting values in the EEPROM. We
assumed that all these values are addresses that refer to the ROM, except one
which refers to the EEPROM. To prove our hypothesis we checked the data
contained at the address corresponds to a 8051 assembler language which corre-
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to verify the calling convention of this native Java Interface.
To exploit this weakness, we added to the method table a fake method
(a method with a flag value equals to 2) contains an offset to an address in
the indirection table. Each element in the indirection table refers to a native
function. At this offset we put the address of our shellcode. Without integrity
check, the Java Card Runtime execute the malicious code. Finally, to execute
the native shell code the parameter of an invokestatic instruction, or another
kind of call instruction should be changed by the address of our fake method.
Thus, the faulty instruction provides a way to execute any shell code with native
privilege. With this shell code, we have been able to do a memory dump of the
ROM code. Examining carefully the code we discovered the cryptographic code
corresponding to the embedded algorithms within this specific card.
3.5 A complete Methodology to Attack Smart Card
In his PhD, Bouffard [2] applied the Attack Tree Analysis (ATA) to have a global
view on the vulnerability of the smart card. Attack trees have been introduced
by Schneier in[15], they represent a convenient approach to analyze the different
ways in which a system can be attacked. It is an analytical technique (top-down)
where an undesirable event is defined and the system is then analyzed to find the
combinations of basic events that could lead to the undesirable event. Such an
analysis is closed to the risk analysis community with the cause-effect diagrams.
An attack tree is a tree in which the nodes represent attacks. The root node of
the tree is the property that an attacker wants to break. Children of a node are
refinements of this goal, and leafs therefore represent initial causes. An attack
tree is not a model of all possible combination but a restricted set. It is related to
the property evaluated. In this case, code integrity is the most sensible property
because if not guaranteed, it enables the attacker to execute any arbitrary code.
The property we want to protect is the integrity of the code which can be vi-
olated by a Control Flow Transfer (CFT) attack. So one of the events which can
transgress this property is the CFT attack which becomes the root of the subtree
of the code integrity ATA. Until now, the control flow attack instance was only
the EMAN2 attack. To mitigate such an attack, it was only required to either
check at runtime the locals, pass the BCV or enable a frame integrity check. Such
leaf requires to check the underflow of the stack on some instructions. Some of
the cards now implement a frame integrity that disallows to arbitrary write into
the frame. One can remark that the Frame Integrity detection mechanism covers
both EMAN2 and Faugeron’s attack, while the Check of Local Variables covers
only the EMAN2.
To succeed, detection event and mitigation event must be inhibited with a
not gate. In this figure a nand gate plays this role. The CFT attack represented
in Figure 1 will succeed if the adequate ill formed CAP is loaded and no integrity





Fig. 1. Attack Tree
When the event is detected, then the card is muted and the attack is stopped.
We use this methodology to provide a clear overview on how different events can
be combined to set up attacks that can break the integrity of the code. We do
not pay attention here on the valuation of the effort of the attacker but on the
efficiency of a counter measure. The minimal cut of an ATA defines the minimal
sets of basic events determining an attack scenario. Closer to the root is the
detection event or the mitigation event better is the coverage.
4 Conclusion and Future Works
We have presented here a set of attacks concerning the smart card world an in
particular the Java Card domain. The abality to download application from an
untrusted environment open the possibility to characterize the content of the
smart card. In particular it allows the attacker to recover code from application
(EEPROM) or from the system (ROM) but also to recover some of the data that
do not belong him. integrity and confidentiality can be broken just using the
techniques used in main stream IT programming. We proposed a methodology
based on attack trees to model the knowledge of the attacker. By defining a
minimal cut in such a tree, we define the scenario that could lead to the attack.
Such a tree can also be used as a defensive means by defining close to the root the
adequate counter measure. This optimize the coverage and thus the efficiency of
the defense.
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